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Herman v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (February 23, 2006)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – DNA EVIDENCE  
& PRESENTENCE REPORTS 
 
Summary 
 
 In this case, the Court considered two issues: (1) whether DNA evidence 
voluntarily submitted to a public facility to absolve a defendant of a crime may be used in 
an unrelated criminal prosecution, and (2) whether reading a presentence report to a jury 
during the sentencing phase is error when the report cannot be made part of the public 
record. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The Court concluded (1) that the DNA evidence was properly admitted; and (2) 
that the presentence report was improperly read to the jury.  The Court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction, but reversed and remanded for a new sentencing phase. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
In 1997, Leslie Carter was found dead in a women’s bathroom in Reno.  Carter’s 
body was partially undressed and her injuries indicated a violent struggle.  Authorities 
found blood that was not Carter’s in the bathroom and on the victim’s pants. Investigators 
tested the blood for a DNA match, but none was found.   
 In 1999, Willie Herman was charged with robbery, and voluntarily submitted a 
blood sample to help prove his innocence.  Herman was acquitted.  Authorities entered 
Herman’s DNA results into a criminal database without Herman’s knowledge or 
permission.   
In 2000, authorities retested the blood found on Carter’s pants.  It matched 
Herman’s DNA profile. In 2000 and 2001, detectives interviewed Herman three times in 
Lovelock Correctional Center, where Herman was incarcerated for possession of a 
controlled substance.  When detectives met with Herman for the final time in October 
2001, Herman volunteered, without being questioned, that he had not raped or killed 
Carter.  Herman was charged with first-degree murder.   
During Herman’s trial, two of Herman’s former cellmates testified that Herman 
confessed to killing Carter.  During closing arguments, the prosecutor indicated that 
Herman’s statement to detectives that he did not rape or kill Carter contained information 
about the crime not available to the general public, since it was not publicly known that 
Carter had been sexually assaulted.  The prosecutor also stated that Herman could not 
explain how his blood was found at the crime scene.  The jury convicted Herman. 
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            During the sentencing phase, the State read to the jury a presentence report that 
detailed Herman’s multiple prior arrests.  The jury sentenced Herman to life without the 
possibility of parole.  Herman appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
A. DNA Evidence 
 
Herman argued that the DNA evidence from his previous robbery trial was 
inadmissible at his murder trial.  Because Herman failed to raise the issue during trial, the 
Court was limited to addressing plain error.2  The Court found no plain error. 
            Both the United States and Nevada Constitutions prohibit unreasonable search 
and seizure.3  Warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, but consent exempts a 
search from probable cause and warrant requirements.4  The state must prove consent by 
clear and persuasive evidence.5 
The Court found support for the position that when an individual consents to 
provide or voluntarily provides a DNA sample to authorities, there is no Fourth 
Amendment violation when that DNA sample is later used in an unrelated proceeding.6 
The Court then reviewed cases decided by the Supreme Courts of Indiana7 and 
Hawaii,8 which held that an individual has no possessory or privacy interest in his DNA 
sample when it is placed in a state database.  The Court found substantial support for the 
position that a defendant has no expectation of privacy when he volunteers his DNA 
sample without limiting the scope of his consent.9  The Court measures the scope of a 
defendant’s consent by applying a reasonable person standard to determine whether the 
legitimately obtained DNA sample may, like fingerprints, be used for general 
investigative purposes. 
            The Court held that Herman provided his DNA sample without limiting the scope 
of his consent.  A reasonable person in Herman’s position would have known that the 
DNA sample he gave to prove his innocence and the resulting DNA profile would be 
available for general investigative purposes.  Thus, there was no plain error in admitting 
evidence of Herman’s DNA sample. 
 
                                                 
2 Sterling v. State, 108 Nev. 391, 394, 834 P.2d 400, 402 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.602 (2005). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 18. 
4 Howe v. State, 112 Nev. 458, 463, 916 P.2d 153, 157 (1996). 
5 Lightford v. State, 90 Nev. 136, 139, 520 P.2d 955, 956 (1974). 
6 Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001). 
7 Id.  In Smith, the defendant moved to suppress DNA evidence obtained in a previous case.  In the previous 
case, the court had ordered the defendant to provide a DNA sample, from which a DNA profile was 
created.  The court held that the DNA sample could be used in the later case because authorities obtained it 
lawfully.  The DNA profile that the state created using the sample belonged to the state, and the defendant 
had no expectation of privacy in the state’s records.  Furthermore, the defendant had no possessory or 
ownership interest in the DNA sample once it was used to create the profile.  Id.  
8 State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 142 (Haw. 2003).  The Hawaii Supreme Court held that a defendant has no 
constitutionally protected possessory or privacy interest in his blood sample once authorities lawfully 
obtain it.   Furthermore, a defendant has no privacy interest in the sample itself or the profile created from 
it.  Id.   
9 State v. McCord, 562 S.E.2d 689, 693 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
B. Presentence Report 
Herman argued that it was error to allow the prosecution to read the presentence 
report to the sentencing jury.  Because Herman did not raise the issue below, the Court 
only addressed plain error and constitutional error sua sponte.10 
To warrant a new sentencing hearing based on an alleged due process violation, a 
defendant must show actual prejudice.11   
During a sentencing proceeding, the court may consider facts and circumstances 
that would be inadmissible at trial.12 
           The district court is afforded wide discretion in its sentencing decisions and the 
Nevada Supreme Court refrains from interfering with the sentence imposed when the 
record does not show prejudice resulting from the admission of information founded on 
facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.”13  NRS 175.552(3) 
permits evidence of any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, regardless of 
the inadmissibility of that evidence at trial.  However, there are constitutional constraints 
on the court’s discretion.   
In the penalty phase of a capital case, evidence of the defendant's character and 
specific instances of conduct are admissible, but the evidence must be relevant and the 
danger of unfair prejudice must not substantially outweigh its probative value.14 
Pursuant to NRS 176.156, a presentence report is to be presented to both the 
defense and the prosecution, who each may object to any factual errors in the report.  The 
report is confidential and is not to be made part of the public record.15   
Here, the prosecution read the presentence report to the jury, including a 
description of seventeen previous unrelated arrests.  The Court held that the reading of 
the presentence report to the jury was tantamount to making it part of the public record.  
Additionally, the Court found that some of the information contained in the sentencing 
report, including Herman’s arrest for possession of paraphernalia, was clearly not more 
probative than it was prejudicial with respect to Herman’s violent character and capacity 
to kill.  Therefore, the Court concluded that it was plain error to allow the prosecution to 
read the presentence report to the jury, and for a new sentencing proceeding. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court held that it was not plain error to admit Herman’s DNA information at 
trial.  A person who volunteers DNA information for public use without expressly 
limiting the scope of his consent has no expectation of privacy in his DNA profile.  
Additionally, the Court held that it was plain error to allow the presentence report to be 
read to the jury.  The Court remanded to the district court for a new sentencing phase. 
                                                 
10 Sterling v. State, 108 Nev. 391, 394, 834 P.2d 400, 402 (1992). 
11 McKenna v. State, 114 Nev. 1044, 1050, 968 P.2d 739, 742-43 (1998). 
12 Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 93-94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). 
13 Id. at 94, 545 P.2d at 1161. 
14 McKenna, 114 Nev. at 1051-52, 968 P.2d at 744. 
15 NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.156(5) (2005). 
